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With its plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court erred by rejecting 
the universal in favor of the particular. Liberal immigration theorists, on 
the other hand, make the opposite error by rejecting the particular in favor 
of the universal.  Drawing on classic international law publicists and the 
Catholic philosophical tradition, this essay argues that the two concepts—
the state’s greater duty toward its own citizens (the particular) and equal 
dignity and worth of all human beings (the universal)—go hand in hand: 
complementing each other and giving the state a qualified right to limit 
immigration along with a qualified duty to admit vulnerable émigrés. 
 
Footnote 1 of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Arizona v. United States serves 
as my point of departure. Scalia says:  
Many of the 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century commentators 
maintained that states should exclude foreigners only for good 
reason. Pufendorf, for example, maintained that states are 
generally expected to grant “permanent settlement to strangers 
who have been driven from their former home,” though 
acknowledging that, when faced with the prospect of mass 
immigration, “every state may decide after its own custom what 
privilege should be granted in such a situation.”1   
Scalia mentions what he characterizes as “prudential limitations”2 on the 
power to exclude aliens in the context of his argument that Arizona, like the 
United States, has a right inherent in sovereignty to exclude aliens from its 
territory “subject only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or 
constitutionally imposed by Congress.”3  
                                                                                                                 
 * Gene and Elaine Edwards Chair in Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I 
would like to thank the Oklahoma Law Review for hosting this symposium and my fellow 
panelists for their insightful comments and engaging dialogue. 
 1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS bk. III, ch. III, § 10, at 366 
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688)) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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I won’t focus on the merits of Scalia’s argument that individual states 
within the United States retain sovereign powers to exclude.4 My interest 
lies, instead, in his recognition that historically the sovereign power over 
immigration was limited—not plenary. This narrative, although presented 
in threadbare fashion in the footnote of a dissenting opinion, offers a 
corrective to 125 years of misguided sovereign absolutism.  
The dominant narrative—the one that is the subject of this symposium—
is succinctly summed up by the Supreme Court in the 1972 case of 
Kleindienst v. Mandel:  
In accord with ancient principles of the international law of 
nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case [Chae 
Chan Ping] held broadly . . . that the power to exclude aliens is 
“inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal 
international relations and defending the country against foreign 
encroachments and dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively 
by the political branches of government . . . .”5  
                                                                                                                 
 4. David Martin’s symposium contribution provides an implicit reply. See David A. 
Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 
(2015) (Chae Chan Ping answered “a federalism question,” establishing “that the federal 
government in fact does possess the authority to regulate migration”). 
 5. 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (citations omitted). In his contribution to this symposium, 
Kevin Johnson makes a forceful argument that, as a legal matter, the dominant narrative is 
muzzled by statutory and regulatory interpretation, lessening the harshness of plenary 
power’s full potential. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A 
New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (2015) (“[T]he 
Court has, to a large extent, continued to bring U.S. immigration law into the jurisprudential 
mainstream.”); see also Martin, supra note 4, at 32 (“The litigation picture is not so bleak as 
often portrayed. Subconstitutional litigation is plentiful, with a significant success 
rate . . . .”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 560 (1990) 
(“The principal decisions that have contributed to this expansion of judicial review in 
immigration cases have not been decisions of constitutional immigration law. Instead, they 
reached results favorable to aliens by interpreting statutes, regulations, or other forms of 
subconstitutional immigration law.”). My interest lies in the political/cultural effect of this 
narrative rather than its strictly legal effect. Margaret Taylor and Kit Johnson’s contribution 
to the symposium, describing the conditions of confinement at Artesia, suggests that the 
dominant narrative has much purchasing power in shaping the cultural/political debate. 
Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes . . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The 
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 185, 186 (2015) (moving beyond formal legal doctrine to assess the plenary 
power doctrine’s influence on “the Executive Branch’s policy response to mass migration”).  
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Since Chae Chan Ping, “[t]he Court without exception has sustained 
Congress' plenary power” over immigration.6 Since that time, this 
misinterpretation of the “ancient principles of international law of the 
nation-states” has led the Court to “repeatedly emphasize[] that ‘over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete 
than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”7 
The plenary power doctrine was born in 1889 in the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States.8 In concluding that a long-term 
United States resident, Chae Chan Ping, was excludable from the United 
States on his return home after visiting China, the Court, quoting Chief 
Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,9 said:  
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no 
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving 
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its 
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of 
that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could 
impose such restriction.10 
The Court, in Chae Chan Ping, failed to quote or explore the Schooner 
Court’s limitation of this supposedly “exclusive and absolute” right—“all 
sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain 
peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within 
their respective territories which sovereignty confers. This consent may, in 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). 
 7. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). 
 8. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 9. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
 10.  Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). My focus is on the Supreme 
Court’s initial error in concluding that nation-states have an absolute right to exclude under 
international law. There are, however, at least two other bases for limiting the sovereign 
power to exclude: one that would have been available to the Court in 1889 and the other of 
more recent origin. First, the Court did not analyze whether the Constitution itself placed 
internal as opposed to external restraints on the ability to exclude. For example, does the 
Constitution’s equal protection norm forbid exclusion based upon race? See Michael 
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 976-77. Second, 
more recent cases, including Kleindienst v. Mandel, fail to address the rights revolution in 
international law over the past several decades, which limits the sovereignty of nation-states 
in ways that might be relevant to immigration. See id. at 1009-15.   
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some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common opinion, 
growing out of that usage.”11 Instead, the Chae Chan Ping Court continued:  
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of 
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as 
a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, 
the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the 
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be 
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.12 
Therefore, if 
the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different 
race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be 
dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be 
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the 
nation of which the foreigners are subjects.13 
What are the “ancient principles of the international law of nation-states” 
regarding the international movement of persons? And, do Chae Chan Ping 
and its progeny correctly characterize these “ancient principles?” Or is there 
some merit to the hint of limited sovereignty found in both the Schooner 
case and Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Arizona case? 
Three years after Chae Chan Ping, the Court held that 
[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners 
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and 
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.14 
A year later, the Court added that “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport 
foreigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any steps towards 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Schooner, 11 U.S. at 136. 
 12. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. The Court did hint at some limiting principle, 
suggesting the exercise of this sovereign power was restricted, if at all, “only by the 
Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or 
less, the conduct of all civilized nations.” Id. at 604. But, the Court explored neither 
constitutional limitations nor potential limitations controlling the “conduct of all civilized 
nations.” 
 13. Id. at 606. 
 14. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (citing Vattel and 
Phillimore). 
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becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as 
absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance 
into the country.”15  
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court delved into International 
Law sources supposedly providing the footing for securing plenary power 
as “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent 
nation.”16 In that 1893 case, the Court quoted several “leading 
commentators,” including Emmerich de Vattel, at length:  
Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the 
country, when he cannot enter without putting the nation in 
evident danger, or doing it a manifest injury. What it owes to 
itself, the care of its own safety, gives it this right; and, in virtue 
of its natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge whether its 
circumstances will or will not justify the admission of the 
foreigner.17 
Three decades ago, Professor Jim Nafziger argued convincingly that the 
Court’s deeply embedded narrative was wrong—ancient principles of 
international law did not give sovereigns an exclusive and absolute plenary 
power over aliens but a qualified one. Nafziger said that 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (emphasis added). 
Persons born in China were ineligible for citizenship until the passage of the Magnuson Act 
in 1943. See Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act (Magnuson Act), Pub. L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 
600 (1943). The United States Naturalization Law of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, restricted 
naturalization to free white persons. After the Civil War, the ability to naturalize was 
extended to “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” Naturalization 
Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254. The final racial restrictions on naturalization ended with 
the McCarran Walter Act of 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 
82-414, 66 Stat. 163. 
 16. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711. Distinguishing deportation from exclusion, three 
dissents rejected the notion of inherent sovereign powers, arguing that the power to deport 
“can be exercised only in subordination to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the 
constitution.” Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 756-58 (Field, J., dissenting); 
id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Victor Romero’s contribution to the symposium explores 
Justice Field’s transition from author of the majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping to dissenter 
in Fong Yue Ting. Victor C. Romero, Elusive Equality: Reflections on Justice Field’s 
Opinions in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 165, 166 (2015) 
(arguing that Justice Field “sought to balance his unfavorable personal and political views 
about mass Chinese immigration against his duty as a federal judge to uphold the 
constitutional rights of individual persons within the United States, regardless of their race 
and citizenship”). 
 17. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707 (quoting Vattel).  
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[w]hen authority is cited [for the proposition that a nation-state 
has the absolute right to exclude all aliens], by far the most 
frequent [authority] is Anglo-American case law from the period 
1889-1893 [Chae Chan Ping to Fong Yue Ting] followed by 
highly selective snippets from the writings of Emmerich de 
Vattel, . . . and black-letter pronouncements apparently rendered 
ex cathedra by earlier publicists.18 
In response to this and other selective quotations, Nafziger said, “Before 
the late 19th century, there was little, in principle, to support the absolute 
exclusion of aliens. . . . Biblical injunctions, which influenced the 
articulation of international law by 17th-and 18th-century publicists, 
favored free transboundary movement.”19 Citing Hugo Grotius, Francisco 
de Vitoria, Samuel Pufendorf, and Vattel, Nafziger continued, “The 
Westphalian system of nation-states complicated the free movement of 
persons by confirming more rigid territorial boundaries. Significantly, 
however, the classic publicists, faced with a new tension between 
traditional freedom of movement and the emerging concept of the sovereign 
state, denied the state an absolute right to exclude aliens.”20 
Vattel said that the sovereign 
cannot, without particular and important reasons, refuse 
permission, either to pass through or reside in the country, to 
foreigners who desire it for lawful purposes. For, their passage 
or their residence being in this case an innocent advantage, the 
law of nature does not give him a right to refuse it.21  
Nafziger concluded that Vattel’s nuanced argument—with its “synthesis 
of natural law and positivism”—was “misinterpreted” by the Court and 
later defenders of sovereign absolutism.22 He suggested that “this distortion 
or selective reading of Vattel” might be due to “the . . . ascendancy of 
positivism, especially during the formative period of immigration law at the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 804 (1983). 
 19.  Id. at 809. 
 20.  Id. at 810. 
 21.  Id. at 814 n.49 (quoting Vattel). Scalia renders this “good reason.” Arizona v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012). 
 22.  Nafziger, supra note 18, at 811. “Vattel distinguished the internal law of nations, 
rooted in natural law, from the external law, rooted in what today one might call positivism. 
Internal law establishes sovereign duties as a matter of conscience and principle, whereas 
external law establishes sovereign rights as a matter of will.” Id. at 812. 
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end of the [19th] century. Concepts such as ‘conscience,’ ‘duties of 
humanity,’ and the like, vital to Vattel, were passe to the positivists.”23  
As David Martin has noted, the plenary power doctrine “remains 
stubbornly alive despite a steady barrage of academic criticism.”24 If, as the 
steady barrage of academic criticism25 suggests, the Court erred in 
establishing [or in continuing to adhere to] the plenary power doctrine—in 
other words, if the rights inherent in sovereignty do not include an absolute 
and unqualified right to exclude or deport aliens—what resources are at our 
disposable to navigate the much murkier waters of a sovereign’s qualified 
right to exclude and deport in a post-plenary power world? In short, by 
what criteria can we judge whether the state has—to use Vattel’s test—
“particular and important reasons” to exclude or deport? 
Notice an assumption I am making.  I am assuming that as a matter of 
political reality—and perhaps as a matter of right—the United States will 
continue to restrict immigration, treating some persons as insiders and 
others as outsiders.  If I am right about this assumption, by what criteria do 
we decide how much immigration to allow and by whom? 
Because so much of modern legal theory—including immigration 
theory—is grounded in liberal political theory,26 liberalism would seem to 
be a leading candidate to provide a framework for immigration law and 
justice in a post-plenary power world. Viewing every rights-bearing 
                                                                                                                 
 23.  Id. at 814-15. “Interpretations of Vattel's commentary on foreign migration have, 
however, consistently ignored both the subtleties on the duty side and his qualifications of 
the sovereign ‘right’ to exclude foreigners.” Id. at 814. 
 24. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protection for Aliens: 
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 53. 
 25. See, e.g., Nafziger, supra note 18; Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States 
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 
(1987); Motomura, supra note 5; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle 
of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Michael Scaperlanda, Partial 
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996).  
 26. See e.g., Gila Stopler, The Challenge of Strong Religions in the Liberal State, 32 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 411 (2014) (assuming that we live in a liberal state); Joshua D. Hawley, The 
Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. L. REV. 275 (2014) 
(arguing that modern substantive due process is rooted in a “concept of liberty,” which 
emphasizes “personal moral choice and autonomy”); JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 82-83 (1998) (assuming that liberalism’s “nonneutral principle of 
state neutrality” is “embodied in our federal Constitution”); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1981); see also MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL 
EDUCATION 4 (1999) (“[T]he politics of education provision in a liberal state should be 
guided by liberal principles.”). 
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individual as having equal dignity and worth,27 liberal theory is constructed 
from an atomistic anthropology, which views these individuals as free to 
live their lives (at least their private lives)28 according to self-chosen ends 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the 
Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L. J. 2105, 2113 (1997) [hereinafter Chang, Immigration 
Policy]. Who or what counts as a rights-bearing individual is contested, however. For 
example, Bruce Ackerman argues that “[c]itizenship [which gives rise to rights] . . . is a 
concept in political-not biological—theory,” so that “an individual who lacks dialogic 
competence fails to satisfy the necessary conditions for membership.” ACKERMAN, supra 
note 26, at 74-75. To paraphrase, “the idiot human” has no rights that the reasoning human is 
bound to respect. Id. at 79-80 (“The rights of the talking ape are more secure than those of 
the human vegetable. Citizenship is a matter of political, not biological, theory.”); cf. Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (“[Blacks] had for more than a century before 
been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white 
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect.”) (superseded 1868). A constitutional, political, and 
cultural debate over when nascent human beings acquire rights has continued in the United 
States for over forty years. See e.g., William Saletan, After-Birth Abortion: The Pro-Choice 
Case for Infanticide, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
health_and_science/human_nature/2012/03/after_birth_abortion_the_pro_choice_case_for_i
nfanticide_.html; John Breen & Michael Scaperlanda, Never Get Out’a the Boat: Stenberg v. 
Carhart and the Future of American Law, 30 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2006); Dawn E. Johnsen, 
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, 
Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 599 & n.1 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he 
social determination of how the legal system should view the fetus should be informed by a 
careful consideration of all potential implications” and that “[t]he legal status that society 
chooses to confer upon the fetus is dependent upon the goals being pursued and the effect of 
such status on competing values”). 
 28. Liberalism, like in any other ideology, has the potential to succumb to the 
seductions of totalitarianism. “Even liberal ideology was dangerous, [Alexander Bickel] 
believed, because it had ‘pretensions to universality’ and was therefore inclined to become 
intolerant and oppressive. ‘Our problem,’ he wrote, ‘is the totalitarian tendency of the 
democratic faith.’” Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in 
Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 436 (1996) (quoting ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 12 (2d ed. 1962)) (“Two hundred years earlier, 
ideological liberalism had brought about the French Revolution, which, no matter what good 
it may have yielded, was unmistakably ‘the first of the totalitarian movements to drench the 
Western world in blood, particularly in our own century.’”). Many have argued forcefully 
and sometimes successfully that individuals give up their autonomy when they enter the 
public sphere, especially when they choose to engage in business. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, 
Pluralism and Its Perils: Navigating the Tension Between Gay Rights and Religious 
Expression, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 435 (2014). The public/private divide is contested with 
some liberal theorists venturing far into areas like the family that many would have once 
considered private. See DWYER, supra note 26. Dwyer comes to what he describes as an 
inescapable conclusion “that the very notion of parental rights is illegitimate.” Id. at 63. 
Instead, he argues for a legal regime where the state grant licenses to “legally permit certain 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/6
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untethered from tradition, community, faith, or family.29 “The view of the 
self as an ‘autonomous and sovereign chooser is so deeply entrenched that 
in [early 21st] century America, at least, it is simply part of the cultural air 
that we breathe.”30 
But, as Kevin Johnson suggests, a liberal framework has major 
drawbacks in the real world. Johnson argues that “[l]iberal theory, with its 
commitment to the protection of individual rights, finds it difficult to 
reconcile the rights of noncitizens with closed borders marked by numerous 
restrictions on entry.”31 Bruce Ackerman put it succinctly: “I cannot justify 
my power to exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership 
in an ideal liberal state.”32  
                                                                                                                 
adults to act as parents.” Id. at 64. For my critique of Dwyer, see Michael A. Scaperlanda, 
Producing Trousered Apes in Dwyer’s Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175 (2002). 
 29. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 323, 363 n.159 (1987) (“The metaphysical 
underpinnings of liberal legalism are supplied by the central themes of that tradition: the 
notion that values are subjective and derive from personal desire, and that therefore ethical 
discourse is conducted profitably only in instrumental terms; the view that society is an 
artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals; the separation in political philosophy 
between public and private interest, between state and civil society; and a commitment to a 
formal or procedural rather than a substantive conception of justice.”); Joseph H. Carens, 
Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25, 26 (Brian Barry & 
Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) (“[L]iberal egalitarians care about human freedoms.  People 
should be free to pursue their own projects . . . as long as this does not interfere with the 
legitimate claims of other individuals to do likewise.  In addition, liberal egalitarians are 
committed to equal opportunity, . . . keep[ing] economic, social, and political inequalities as 
small as possible.”). 
 30. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea of Human 
Rights, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 58 (1999-2000); cf. Chang, Immigration Policy, supra note 27, at 
2112 (assuming that “we generally espouse” liberalism “in our political philosophy” but not 
in the immigration arena). 
 31. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003); e.g., Peter H. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85 (1984) (“[I]n a 
truly liberal polity, it would be difficult to justify a restrictive immigration law or perhaps 
any immigration law at all.”). Communitarianism, on the other hand, reinforces the Court’s 
absolutist version of plenary power. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE 
OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
 32. ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 93. Reluctantly, Ackerman would limit immigration 
when the number of potential immigrants burgeons to a number threatening the ongoing 
viability of the liberal state. “The only reason for restricting immigration is to protect the 
ongoing process of liberal conversation itself.” Id. at 95 (emphasis in original). But, he 
understands that this answer is at odds with the liberal ideal because the excluded are “at 
least as good as we are.” Id.; see also Chang, Immigration Policy, supra note 27, at 2112 
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Howard Chang analogizes immigration restrictions with segregation: 
since “[i]mmigration restrictions keep disadvantaged groups of people in 
conditions of poverty and deprive them of equal access to important 
economic opportunities,” they “are much like laws mandating . . . 
residential segregation in the domestic context.”33 Citing Rawls, Chang 
says “discrimination based explicitly on circumstances of birth [including 
location of birth] is at odds with liberal ideals.” “[P]lace of birth would 
appear to be a circumstance that [is] ‘arbitrary from a moral point of 
view.’”34  
The problem with this reasoning is that we don’t live this way, and more 
importantly our experience and intuition—even the better angels of our 
nature—suggest that this way of thinking is not quite right. The 
circumstances of birth do matter morally as well as materially, at least to 
some extent. No one thinks twice about me expending my resources to feed, 
clothe, house, and educate my children to the exclusion or near exclusion of 
someone else’s child. In providing for my children, I’m worse off than 
some and better off than many. But, worse off or better off, I have a unique 
moral obligation to my children. In fact, I have a moral obligation to the 
community to meet my moral obligation to my children.35 And, the law to 
some extent reinforces this obligation.36  
Similarly, we know intuitively that the nation-state owes more to its 
citizens than it does to the citizens of other countries. In fact, it has a moral 
obligation to the global community to provide its citizens with the 
conditions for human flourishing. In both cases—of family and nation—my 
greater obligation to my own does not detract from the equal dignity and 
worth of those who are not my own.  
The two concepts—greater duty to my own and equal dignity and worth 
of all human beings—go hand in hand, complementing each other. But as 
we have seen, liberal theory lacks the resources to properly balance these 
                                                                                                                 
(“Liberal political theory creates a dilemma for the Court because liberal principles would 
seem to justify very little regulation of immigration.”). 
 33. Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case 
for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 12 
(2008). 
 34. Id. at 13.  
 35. See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Framework—
Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2000) (“Blackstone described the father's natural law duty 
to support children as a moral obligation stemming from responsibility for bringing the child 
into the world.”).  
 36. See id. at 1063 (“The duty of both parents to support a child is recognized and 
regulated by statute in every state today.”). 
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two complementary moral obligations. In adopting the plenary power 
doctrine, the Supreme Court erred by rejecting the universal in favor of the 
particular,37 while immigration theorists working in the liberal tradition 
make the opposite error by rejecting the particular in favor of the universal. 
Philosopher Alasdair McIntyre suggests that if one’s own tradition lacks 
the capacity to solve an intractable problem (and I suggest here the liberal 
political theory lacks the resources to solve the intractable problem of 
continuing restrictions on immigration), members of that tradition ought to 
look at rival traditions to see if they have the capacity to solve the problem 
in a more satisfactory way.38 
The Judeo-Christian tradition provides such an alternate to the liberal 
tradition. A decade ago, University of Oklahoma law graduate—then-Tenth 
Circuit Judge, now President of Oklahoma City University—Robert Henry, 
quoted Leviticus:  
If an alien will reside with you in your land, you shall not 
persecute him. The alien who resides with you shall be to you 
like a citizen of yours, and you shall love him as yourself, 
because you were aliens in the land of Egypt. I am the YWWH, 
your God.39  
Judge Henry wrote this in a dissent in Soskin v. Reinerstein to remind the 
other two judges on the panel (a Catholic and a Jew) of their obligations to 
the alien.40 For Christians,  
The émigré Holy Family of Nazareth, fleeing into Egypt, is the 
archetype of every refugee family. Jesus, Mary, and Joseph, 
living in exile in Egypt to escape the fury of an evil king, are, for 
                                                                                                                 
 37. A modern communitarian alternative to liberalism supports the theoretical 
foundations of the plenary power narrative. See WALZER, supra note 31, at 61-62 (“[T]he 
right to choose an admission policy is . . . basic . . . . At stake here is the shape of the 
community that acts in the world . . . . Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal 
independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination.  Without them, there 
could not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and 
women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their 
common life.”). 
 38. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 166-67 (1988). 
 39. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1265 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (Henry, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Leviticus 19:33–34). 
 40. The Judeo-Christian tradition provides alternative narratives in many areas of law. 
See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, Quas Primas and the Economic Ordering of Society for the 
Social Reign of Christ the King: A Third Perspective on the Bainbridge/Sargent Law and 
Economics Debate, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 369 (2008). 
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all times and all places, the models and protectors of every 
migrant, alien and refugee of whatever kind who, whether 
compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave 
his native land, his beloved parents and relatives, his close 
friends, and to seek a foreign soil.41 
Although the theological tradition of Judaism or Christianity may provide 
some inspiration for those operating from a secular framework,42 it won’t 
provide an authoritative voice for the liberal theorist because the theological 
tradition rests on divine revelation, not human reason. The vast 
philosophical resources of the Christian tradition, however, are available to 
all—including liberals—since these resources are grounded in reason, 
tradition, and experience rather than revelation. In fact, these were the 
resources lost in the Supreme Court’s positivistic misunderstanding of the 
classic publicists, such as Grotius, de Vitoria, Pufendorf, and Vattel.43 It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the Christian tradition—rather than the liberal 
tradition—sees clearly the deficiencies in sovereign absolutism’s plenary 
power doctrine and can articulate an alternative narrative closely 
corresponding with our informed intuition that the universal is realized 
within the particular.  
Like the liberal tradition, the Christian tradition recognizes the human 
dignity of every person.44 But, unlike the mainstream of liberal thought, the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Pope Pius XII, Apostolic Constitution Exsul Familia Nazarethana (Aug. 1, 1952), 
available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/p12exsul.htm; see also Pontifical 
Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, Erga Migrantes Caritas 
Christi (The Love of Christ Toward Migrants), No. 15 (May 3, 2004), available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/migrants/documents/rc_pc_migrants_doc_
20040514_erga-migrantes-caritas-christi_en.html (“In the foreigner a Christian sees not 
simply a neighbour, but the face of Christ Himself, who was born in a manger and fled into 
Egypt, where he was a foreigner, summing up and repeating in His own life the basic 
experience of His people”); PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF 
THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 108 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM], available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeac
e_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html (from ch. 3, part II.A, “Creatures in the 
Image of God”) (“The fundamental message of Sacred Scripture proclaims that the human 
person is a creature of God (cf. Ps 139:14-18), and sees in his being in the image of God the 
element that characterizes and distinguishes him . . . .”). 
 42. For example, although he rejected Christian revelation, Richard Rorty viewed 
Christians as “toolmakers” working to alleviate “cruelty.” RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, 
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 55 (1989). 
 43. See Nafziger, supra note 18. 
 44. See, e.g., COMPENDIUM, supra note 41, ¶¶ 144-148 (from ch. 3, part III.D, “The 
Equal Dignity of All People”); John E. Coons & Patrick M. Brennan, Nature and Human 
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Christian tradition proposes that “humans are constituted through their 
associating” in societies.45 I use Tom Hanks’ character in the movie 
“Castaway” to make this point to my students. Hanks’ character, Chuck 
Noland, is marooned on a deserted tropical island where he can meet all his 
material needs. If the Enlightenment’s versions of the State of Nature are 
correct, he should have no associational needs. But, given the reality of his 
social nature, he creates a sub-optimal association by painting a face on a 
Wilson-brand volleyball and naming it Wilson. In short, Noland craves a 
society and is in danger of going mad without it. 
Exploring the work of Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, Patrick 
Brennan refers to society as “not a thing,” but “a range of activities,” which 
human persons must engage to be in tune with their nature.46  In addition to 
marriage, family, and the Church, “there are also the schools, clubs, 
cloisters, sodalities, guilds, unions, and so forth—the countless societies 
men and women create, by reason and will, as time and circumstance allow 
or demand.”47  
The “ordinary development of the human person” also requires 
“participation in society that is political.”48  In this classical and Catholic 
tradition, “[p]olitical society is the architectonic society by which 
individuals, already associated in other societies (in which authoritative 
                                                                                                                 
Equality, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 287, 288-89 (1995) (“From antiquity, religious believers and 
unbelievers alike have associated human dignity with those faculties—reason and will—that 
allow the self to commit either for or against a real good and thereby to advance toward or 
recede from moral self-perfection.”); Michael A. Scaperlanda, Immigration Law: A Catholic 
Christian Perspective on Immigration Justice in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: 
CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW 292, 302 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa 
Stanton Collett eds., 2007) (“With liberal egalitarians, but for very different reasons, 
Catholic Christians conclude that all humans have equal moral worth.”). Who counts as a 
rights bearing person, is, however, much contested in the liberal tradition. 
 45. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Contributions of Catholics to the Socio-Political 
Order, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2007) [hereinafter Brennan, Contributions]. 
 46. See id. at 1225. 
[I]n the Catholic view, every kind of thing, whether it be carrot, cow, or human 
person, has its own nature or, as Maritain sometimes says, the “normality of its 
functioning.”  Just as a piano functions normally or according to its nature only 
when it has the right number of strings and is in tune, so too the human person 
functions normally only when he is, as it were, “in tune”: nourished, physically 
healthy, and so forth. 
Id. “To be ‘in tune,’ a human must also engage in society or, as I would prefer to say, 
associate.” Id. I refer to “normality of [human] functioning” as flourishing. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1224 (“Lest the import of this claim remain dormant, allow me to repeat it: 
Political society is a demand of human nature itself.”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
132 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:119 
 
 
government of a sort also occurs), use reason and will to create the 
conditions under which they can achieve their normality of functioning”— 
where they can flourish.49 As Brennan puts it, “the state is not a whole, not 
a freestanding entity with its own rights, privileges, dignity, and perhaps 
even sovereignty.”50 Rather, it is “a part of political society, part of the 
body politic.”51 Specifically, “[i]t is the part of the body politic concerned 
with the good of the whole, or the common good.”52 
These plural and diverse societies, including political society, have one 
thing in common—they have members. There are family members, Church 
members, members of the Rotary Club, members of the school or 
community choir, and members of the local, national, and international 
Teamsters Union. Membership implies the existence of non-members.53 
                                                                                                                 
 49.  Id. at 1226. “[T]he word political means engaging together in self-government in 
order to realize individuals’ goods and the good that is common to all.” Id. 
As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions of political society in vogue 
today, the conception here is of a pluralist body politic bringing together in its 
organic unity a diversity of social groupings and structures, each of them 
embodying positive liberties. Civil society is made up not only of individuals, 
but of particular societies formed by them, and a pluralist body politic would 
allow to these societies the greatest autonomy possible and would diversify its 
own internal structure in keeping with what is typically required by their 
nature.  
Id. at 1227 (quoting JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM 163-64 (Joseph W. Evans 
trans., 1968) (1936)). 
 50. Id. at 1229. 
 51. Id.; see also COMPENDIUM, supra note 41, ¶ 168 (from ch. 4, part II.C, “Tasks of the 
Political Community”) (“The State, in fact, must guarantee the coherency, unity and 
organization of the civil society of which it is an expression, in order that the common good 
may be attained with the contribution of every citizen.”). 
 52. Brennan, Contributions, supra note 45, at 1226. “One kind of society humans are 
both capable of forming and crave is the one we call political society, where the word 
political means engaging together in self-government in order to realize individuals’ goods 
and the good that is common to all.” Id. “What the person is doing in civil society, and what 
the legislator is doing in that part of civil society that we call the state, is implementing the 
natural law for the common good of society.” Id. at 1229.   
 53. Wendell Berry makes this point poignantly in his novel Jayber Crow: 
If you have lived in Port William a little more than two years, you are still, by 
Port William standards, a stranger, liable, to have your name 
mispronounced. . . . [T]hough I was only twenty-two when I came to the town, 
many . . . would call me “Mr. Cray” to acknowledge that they did not know me 
well. . . . Once my customers took me to themselves, they called me Jaybird,  
and then Jayber. Thus I became, and have remained, a possession of Port 
William. 
WENDELL BERRY, JAYBER CROW 11 (2000).  
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Just as there are nonmembers to a family and nonmembers to the Rotary 
Club, there are nonmembers—commonly called aliens54—to political 
society. This isn’t simply how we live; it is who we are as human beings. 
“In other words, society, at least in potency, is as primordial and basic a 
reality as individual humans.”55 
Pace the liberal tradition, placedness-birth, family, community, 
membership in certain societies and not others—matters. Emigration 
involves a real loss to both the person leaving their political society and to 
the political society left behind.56 And states have the right to control their 
borders, including limiting immigration that could threaten the well-
being—the flourishing or normality of function—of a political society.57 
                                                                                                                 
 54. To some “the word ‘alien,’ even when not adorned with the modifier ‘illegal,’ has 
always struck a disturbing chord. Many feel that the term connotes dehumanizing qualities 
of strangeness or inferiority (space aliens come readily to mind) and that its use builds walls, 
strips human beings of their essential dignity, and needlessly reinforces an ‘outsider’ status.” 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1-2 (5th ed. 2009). I disagree. “[I]n a very real sense ‘alien’ is an appropriate term 
for describing the relationship between the immigrant and his new country. Language, 
culture, history, and tradition often create a wide gulf between the migrant and the native. 
They do not yet belong to each other.” Michael Scaperlanda, Stirring the Melting Pot: A 
Recipe for Immigrant Acceptance, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1171, 1182 (2013) (reviewing PHILIP 
KRETSEDEMAS, THE IMMIGRATION CRUCIBLE: TRANSFORMING RACE, NATION, AND THE LIMITS 
OF THE LAW (2012)); see also Alien, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/4988?isAdvanced=false&result=1&rskey=7xc6tn& (defining “alien” as one who 
belongs “to another person, place, or family; not of one's own; from elsewhere, foreign”). 
 55. Brennan, Contributions, supra note 45, at 1227.  
 56. As Pope John Paul II wrote, 
[Emigration] constitutes a loss for the country which is left behind. It is the 
departure of a person who is also a member of a great community united by 
history, tradition and culture; and that person must begin life in the midst of 
another society united by a different culture and very often by a different 
language. In this case, it is the loss of a subject of work, whose efforts of mind 
and body could contribute to the common good of his own country, but these 
efforts, this contribution, are instead offered to another society which in a sense 
has less right to them than the person's country of origin. 
ST. JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 23 (1981), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens 
_en.html; see also GUSTAVO PÉREZ FIRMAT, NEXT YEAR IN CUBA: A CUBANO’S COMING OF 
AGE IN AMERICA 22 (1995) (describing exiles as amputees) (“Just as people who lose limbs 
sometimes continue to ache or tingle in the missing calf or hand, the exile suffers the 
absence of the self he left behind.”); Michael Scaperlanda, Immigration and Evil: The 
Religious Challenge, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 835 (2006). 
 57. See Strangers No Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope: A Pastoral Letter 
Concerning Migration from the Catholic Bishops of Mexico and the United States ¶ 36 (Jan. 
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Pace sovereign absolutism, the state lacks the exclusive and absolute 
right to exclude or expel nonmembers on behalf of the political society it 
serves58 because the common good of a political society cannot be viewed 
in isolation of the good of nonmembers. The Catholic tradition expresses 
this through three interrelated principles—the universal destination of 
goods, the preferential option for the poor, and solidarity.  
The Universal Destination of Goods posits that the earth and all its 
bounty are for the benefit of everyone.59 This does “not mean that 
everything is at the disposal of each person or of all people.”60 Although it 
qualifies the use of private property, the Universal Destination of Goods 
does not deny the rights of private property.61 
                                                                                                                 
22, 2003) [hereinafter Strangers No Longer], available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/human-life-and-dignity/immigration/strangers-no-longer-together-on-the-journey-of-
hope.cfm (“The Church recognizes the right of sovereign nations to control their territories 
but rejects such control when it is exerted merely for the purpose of acquiring additional 
wealth.”). 
 58. Contra Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). 
 59. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 41, ¶ 172 (from ch. 4, part III.A, “Origin and 
Meaning”) (“Each person must have access to the level of well-being necessary for his full 
development. The right to the common use of goods is the ‘first principle of the whole 
ethical and social order’ and ‘the characteristic principle of Christian social doctrine’. . . . It 
is first of all a natural right, inscribed in human nature and not merely a positive right 
connected with changing historical circumstances; moreover it is an ‘inherent’ right.”). 
 60. Id. ¶ 173 (“If it is true that everyone is born with the right to use the goods of the 
earth, it is likewise true that, in order to ensure that this right is exercised in an equitable and 
orderly fashion, regulated interventions are necessary, interventions that are the result of 
national and international agreements, and a juridical order that adjudicates and specifies the 
exercise of this right.”). 
 61. Id. ¶¶ 176-181 (from ch. 4, part III.B, “The Universal Destination of Goods and 
Private Property”). 
Private property and other forms of private ownership of goods assure a person 
a highly necessary sphere for the exercise of his personal and family autonomy 
and ought to be considered as an extension of human freedom . . . stimulating 
exercise of responsibility, it constitutes one of the conditions for civil liberty. 
Id. ¶ 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Private property is a means for “respecting the 
principle of the universal destination of goods” and not an end in itself; therefore it is not 
absolute but “subordinated to the right to common use.” Id. ¶ 177. The rights of ownership 
also come with responsibilities respecting use: “Individual persons may not use their 
resources without considering the effects that this use will have, rather they must act in a 
way that benefits not only themselves and their family but also the common good.” Id. at 
¶178; cf. Rose Cuison Villazor, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: Immigration as Property, 
68 OKLA. L. REV. 137, 161 (2015) (noting that “‘social relations theory’ of property” shifts 
the emphasis from a “property as a relationship between a person and a thing” to a 
“relationship between persons with respect to valued resources”). 
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The Preferential Option for the Poor grows out of thick understanding of 
the Universal Destination of Goods. “[T]he principle of the universal 
destination of goods requires that the poor, the marginalized, and in all 
cases those whose living conditions interfere with their proper growth 
should be the focus of particular concern.”62 Although rooted in the 
Church’s theology—“the exercise of Christian charity”63—the preferential 
option for the poor, along with the principles of the universal destination of 
goods and solidarity, corresponds with the intuition of liberal egalitarians.64 
Solidarity highlights “in a particular way the intrinsic social nature of the 
human person [and] the equality of all in dignity and rights.”65 Solidarity is 
“a moral virtue that determines the order of institutions.”66 As an “authentic 
moral virtue,” solidarity requires “a firm and persevering determination to 
commit oneself to the common good. That is to say to the good of all and of 
each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.”67 
These three principles not only limit a political community’s right to 
exclude would-be immigrants, they give these communities a duty to allow 
immigration where a) the receiving community has the ability to absorb 
immigrants, and b) the conditions in the sending country are such that the 
émigrés lack the resources to flourish normally as human beings with innate 
dignity.  This obligation places special responsibilities on the United States. 
“More powerful economic nations, which have the ability to protect and 
feed their residents, have a stronger obligation to accommodate migration 
flows.”68 
For “particular and important reasons,” the United States can and should 
restrict immigration because the universal dignity of the human person is 
                                                                                                                 
 62. COMPENDIUM, supra note 41, ¶ 182 (from ch. 4, part III.C, “The Universal 
Destination of Goods and the Preferential Option for the Poor”).  
 63. Id. 
 64. See Chang, supra note 33. It also corresponds to the impulse of Emperor Julian the 
Apostate who wanted to return the empire to paganism but retain aspects of Christian 
charity. See Julian the Apostate, NEW ADVENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent. 
org/cathen/08558b.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2015) (stating that while rejecting Christianity 
itself, the Emperor Julian “urged pagans to imitate such Christian virtues as charity and 
mercy”). 
 65. COMPENDIUM, supra note 41, ¶ 193 (from ch. 4, part VI.B, “Solidarity as a Social 
Principle and a Moral Virtue”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Solidarity is not merely “a feeling of vague 
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 68. Strangers No Longer, supra note 57, ¶ 36. 
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realized in the particulars of family, community, and—since the peace at 
Westphalia—the nation-state. But, prudential judgments about these 
matters cannot be made if we reject the universal in favor of the particular, 
or the particular in favor of the universal. Between plenary power’s 
sovereign absolutism resting in the state and liberal theory’s self-
sovereignty, classical and Catholic resources offer a third narrative in which 
the universal dignity of the person is realized within particular political 
communities who achieve their own good partially by their openness to 
outsiders in need of the resources they possess in abundance. This third 
narrative corresponds more closely than the alternatives with our national 
self-understanding as expressed in Emma Lazarus’ poem “The New 
Colossus”69 and with our moral intuitions about the parameters of a just 
immigration policy.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 69. “Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, / 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. / Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, / 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”  EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883), 
available at http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm. 
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